Mary Fender v. Delaware Division of Revenue by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-14-2015 
Mary Fender v. Delaware Division of Revenue 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Mary Fender v. Delaware Division of Revenue" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 1098. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/1098 
This October is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-4140 
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DELAWARE DIVISION OF REVENUE;  
MICHAEL SMITH, In his individual and official capacities;  
THOMAS EOPPOLO, In his individual and official capacities 
 
       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(District Court No.:  1-12-cv-01364) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
       
 
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on September 8, 2015 
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Before:  VANASKIE, NYGAARD, and RENDELL Circuit Judges 
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O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Appellant Mary Fender appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to 
the Delaware Division of Revenue (“DOR”), her former employer, and Michael Smith 
and Thomas Eoppolo, her former supervisors, on her § 1983 claim for First Amendment 
retaliation and her claim for violation of the Delaware Whistleblower Protection Act 
(“WPA”).  We will affirm the grant of judgment in favor of the DOR on the WPA claim 
but vacate the judgment for Smith and Eoppolo on the First Amendment claim because 
we disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that Fender was complaining only about 
matters of private, not public, concern.   
I. Background 
 Fender began working for the DOR in 2003 as a tax auditor.  Her position was 
originally in Wilmington, but in 2005 or 2006, she transferred to New Castle.  Between 
2009 and 2010, the DOR reorganized and Eoppolo became her direct supervisor, with 
Smith supervising Eoppolo.  In April 2010, Smith transferred Fender’s position back to 
Wilmington and asked her to return there by May 2010.  She returned to Wilmington on 
December 14, 2010 and then, six days later, she requested a transfer to the Dover office.  
Smith rejected her transfer request.  After rejecting her transfer, Smith noted in an email 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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that Fender was “trying to sell her agenda.”  (App. 333.)  In his deposition, when asked 
“what agenda is she trying to sell,” Smith responded that Fender’s “idea was that the 
Division of Revenue in her opinion discriminated against women as a whole.”  (App. 
581-82.)   
 On December 22, 2010, Fender complained to DOR Deputy Director Colleen 
Yegla about the transfer denial and about generally unfair treatment.  Fender noted that 
Smith had recently approved a transfer request for a male employee and claimed that her 
transfer request was denied because she was a woman.  Fender also complained that 
Eoppolo had called her on her personal cell phone while she was at a doctor’s 
appointment, and that he did not approve her financial transactions promptly.   
 Fender filed an EEOC complaint on February 11, 2011 alleging sex and age 
discrimination against Smith and Eoppolo.  Her EEOC complaint described the incident 
when Eoppolo called her while she was at the doctor and Smith’s denial of her transfer 
request.  Fender said that Eoppolo called at the doctor’s appointment because “this was 
him trying to intimidate me.  He does not chek [sic] up on male counterparts.”  (App. 
808.)  She also said that she “spoke about this with a coworker in the HR department and 
her response was she didn’t know how they get away with some of the things they do.  
She said they were referred to as the ‘boys club.’”  (App. 808.)  In the EEOC form, 
Fender referenced Florence Smith, a woman who “has been waiting for her test for 
promotion to be graded for 1 yr.   male counterparts got interviews for their 
promotions.”  (App. 809.)   
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 Fender claims that after she filed her EEOC complaint, her supervisors stopped 
her from starting new projects, gave her pre-existing projects to others, and limited the 
number of letters that she could send.  She also claims that a coworker told her that “he 
was not supposed to talk to me, that I was blackballed, and when they want to try to find 
a way to get you out they will.”  (App. 715.)  Eoppolo asked her to submit a report every 
Monday, tracking her activity from the previous week, even though other male auditors at 
her level were not required to report weekly.   
 In July of 2011, Fender was in a car accident and went on short-term disability.  
She exhausted her allotted leave before returning to work.  The DOR said she could 
return to her previous job on a probationary basis, but Fender refused and her 
employment with DOR concluded.   
 Fender filed suit asserting claims for, inter alia, First Amendment retaliation and 
violation of the WPA.  The District Court granted summary judgment to Appellees on all 
claims.  It held that Fender could not establish a First Amendment retaliation claim 
because her complaints did not address matters of public concern.  The District Court 
explained that Fender “is unable to point to facts in the record supporting her position 
that sex discrimination, as a larger problem within the DOR, was at the heart of her 
complaints.”  (App. 11.)  The District Court noted that Fender’s complaints to Yegla 
focused on “‘unfair treatment’ specific to Fender—e.g., Eoppolo calling Fender’s cell 
phone and failing to approve Fender’s financial transactions in a timely manner; Smith 
and Eoppolo’s refusal to grant Fender’s transfer request.”  (App. 11.)  It reasoned that 
“Fender fails to provide any evidence that the specific complaints . . . were anything other 
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than the personal grievances of an employee, seeking personal relief.”  (App. 12.)  
Because the District Court concluded that Fender had not spoken about a matter of public 
concern, it did not assess the other elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim.   
 The District Court also held that Fender failed to establish a WPA claim because 
the WPA protects only employees who have reported health, safety, or environmental 
hazards or financial mismanagement.   
II. Analysis 
 “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo . . . .”  Viera v. 
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011).  “In conducting our review, we 
view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and draw all 
reasonable inferences in his favor.”  Baldassare v. State of N.J., 250 F.3d 188, 192 n.1 
(3d Cir. 2001).   
  We will vacate the District Court’s judgment in favor of Smith and Eoppolo on 
Fender’s First Amendment retaliation claim because there is evidence that Fender was 
complaining about gender discrimination generally, as opposed to personal grievances.  
A public employee’s statement is protected by the First Amendment when, inter alia, “the 
statement involved a matter of public concern.”  Flora v. Cnty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 
175 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir. 
2006)).  “A public employee’s speech involves a matter of public concern if it can be 
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social or other concern to the 
community.”  Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 412 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baldassare, 
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250 F.3d at 195).  Gender discrimination is clearly a matter of political and social 
concern.  See Azzaro v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 978 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding 
that “gender discrimination” is “as much a matter of public concern as racial 
discrimination”). 
 The issue here is whether Fender’s complaints were, in fact, about gender 
discrimination or were only about denial of her transfer request, delayed approval of her 
financial transactions, and the phone call while she was at a doctor’s appointment.  In 
other words, “public speech cannot ‘constitute[] merely personal grievances.’”  Brennan, 
350 F.3d at 412 (quoting Feldman v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823, 829 (3d Cir. 
1994)).  “This does not, however, suggest that speech which is motivated by private 
concern can never qualify as protected speech. It clearly can if it addresses a matter that 
concerns the public as well as the speaker.”  Id.  There is evidence indicating that Fender 
complained about gender discrimination, not merely her private grievances.  First, 
Fender’s supervisor Smith stated that Fender was trying to sell her agenda “that the 
Division of Revenue in her opinion discriminated against women as a whole.”  (App. 
582.)  Second, Fender’s EEOC complaint states that her supervisor does not check up on 
male workers and that her coworker in Human Resources referred to “the ‘boys club’” 
and said “she didn’t know how they get away with some of the things they do.”  (App. 
808.)  And third, Fender noted in her EEOC form that a woman, “ha[d] been waiting for 
her test for promotion to be graded for 1 yr.” even though “male counterparts got 
interviews for their promotions.”  (App. 809.)  This evidence indicates that Fender was 
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complaining about gender discrimination generally and, therefore, that she spoke about a 
matter of public concern. 
   
 We will, however, affirm the District Court’s ruling on the WPA claim.  The WPA 
protects employees who report violations.  It defines “violation” as “an act or omission” 
that is “[m]aterially inconsistent with, and a serious deviation from, standards 
implemented . . . to protect employees or other persons from health, safety, or 
environmental hazards” or “[m]aterially inconsistent with, and a serious deviation from, 
financial management or accounting standards implemented . . . to protect any person 
from fraud, deceit, or misappropriation of public or private funds or assets.”  Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 19, § 1702(6).  Gender discrimination simply does not fall within this rubric.   
 We will thus vacate the District Court’s judgment as to Fender’s First Amendment 
retaliation claim and remand for the District Court to assess the other elements of her 
First Amendment claim.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment on Fender’s WPA 
claim.   
